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Abstract 
A typical model of investment under uncertainty where firms incur an irreversible 
cost in order to produce is studied with a novel focus on the reciever of this cost ("the 
source"). The source is modeled as a firm or a government that sells a resource or a 
right that are necessary for the production of the final good. We study in detail how 
the source sets its resource's price. We find that this price is a decreasing function of 
the elasticity of the demand for the final good. We also find that when this demand is 
sufficiently low, the source does not lower its price accordingly, and the producers of 
the final good delay their purchases of the resource. The reason is that the source 
expects demand to be higher in the future and does not want to be committed then to a 
low price for its resource.  
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1. Introduction 
The literature on investment under uncertainty typically deals with the case of a firm 
that has to incur an irreversible cost in order to be able to produce. This article looks 
at the part of this setting that has not yet been analyzed – the receiver of the cost. We 
construct a model in which the resource N is necessary for the production of the 
durable good X. The producers of X face the typical investment under uncertainty 
problem studied in the literature, as the cost of each unit of N is an irreversible cost 
from their point of view. The sellers of N face a problem not yet studied – at what 
level should they set the cost of N. The dilemma is not just about the trade-off 
between "selling more but for a lower price" vs. "selling less but for a higher price". 
In fact, setting a sufficiently large price for the resource would lead to a period of no 
sales at all, until the demand for X sufficiently rises to make the X producers want to 
purchase N and start producing X. 
 For simplicity, we assume that N is sold by a monopolist, named "the source" 
henceforth. Two cases are studied: In the first case the source is interested in 
maximizing the value of its sales and in the second case the source is a government 
interested in welfare. The case of a government is of particular relevancy to this 
setting because the government is indeed a major seller of resources such as land, 
broadcasting frequencies and all sorts of franchises. We assume in the case of a 
government that it is using its income from the sales of N to finance its welfare 
enhancing activities in other markets suffering from failures. We show in the article 
that since it also cares about the welfare in the X market, the government sells N at a 
lower cost compared to the case where N is sold by a firm that maximizes the value of 
its the profits from its sales. 
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 A key assumption in the model is that the source sets the price for the resource 
N in a once-and-for-all decision. Qualitatively, it is only a simplifying assumption as 
the forces in action here are the same ones that are active in the more realistic case 
where the source can change the price it charges, but does not do so continuously due 
to physical constraints or menu costs. The main implication of the inability to change 
the price of N smoothly is that it is possible that a fall in the demand for X would send 
the producers of X into a period in which they prefer to delay their purchases of N and 
production of X. Even more interestingly, it might be the case that the source itself, 
sets the price of N at a level that is sufficiently high to make the X producers delay 
their purchases of N. The source thus gives up on revenues from immediate sales in 
order to acquire larger amounts in the future when the demand for X rises and the X 
producers start to purchase the resource N in order to produce more X.  
 Another important assumption in the model is that the source charges the 
producers of X not just for their purchases of N but also for a share of the stream of 
profits they make by selling the X that they produce from this N. This assumption fits 
the case of a government very well, as the government taxes firms' profits. Such 
contracts exist nonetheless in the private sector as well. This assumption strengthens 
the role that the elasticity of the demand for X plays in setting the price of N. Thus for 
example, if the demand is sufficiently inelastic, the source would opt to avoid lowered 
tax revenues by preventing any increase in the quantity in the X market, setting 
therefore an infinite price for the resource N.1 At the other end of the scale, if demand 
is sufficiently elastic, the source would promote increased quantity in the X market by 
setting a negative price for the resource N, i.e., subsidizing it. 
                                                 
1
 Since X is a durable good, sales of N imply additions to the already existing quantity in the X market. 
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 The X market in this article is the same market studied by Leahy (1993). This 
is true although the current paper introduces an endogenous determination of the cost 
of the resource that the X producers must buy to produce. This endogenous 
determination concerns only the source firm and the X producers in the model 
analyzed here take the cost of the resource as given just the same as the producers in 
Leahy's model do. Since it is the same model, all the relevant results already proven 
by Leahy are used here without re-proving them. 
 The article is organized as follows. In section 2 the model is presented and the 
value of the source is analyzed. In section 3 the source's choice of the cost of N and 
the resulting immediate market situation - sales or inaction - is analyzed for the case 
where the source maximizes the value of the revenues it extracts from selling N and 
taxing the X market. In section 4 the same choice is analyzed, this time for the case of 
a government that wishes to extract revenues from the X market, but also cares about 
the welfare in it. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Model 
Consider the market for good X. Production of X requires the resource N. The seller of 
N is a monopoly that fixes the price k per each unit of N. In addition, in each point in 
time the X producers have to pay the fraction t of their instantaneous revenues to the 
seller of N. We assume that the X producers can buy N any time they choose and that 
when such a firm purchases N it must transform it to X immediately. All the X 
producers are risk-neutral and have the same production process: a unit of N is 
transformed to a unit of X at the cost w, i.e., the production function of firm i is Qi ≤ 
Ni, where Qi is firm i’s output and Ni is the amount of N that firm i has. Thus, the 
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supply of good X is Q = N, where Q is the aggregate amount of good X supplied in the 
market and ∑
∞
=
=
1i
iNN .  
The demand for X is given by: 
 
(1) P = 
αQ
A
, 
 
where P is the price of X. A is a geometric Brownian motion that the following rule 
describes its dynamics: 
 
(2) dA = µAdt + σAdZ, 
 
where Z is the standard Wiener process satisfying: 
 
(3) E(dZ) = 0,  E[(dZ)2] = 1,   
 
µ and σ are constants  and σ > 0. By Itô’s lemma and (1), when Q is unchanged the 
evolution of P is governed by: 
 
(4) dP = µPdt + σPdZ, 
 
which means that P is also a geometric Brownian motion. By Itô’s lemma, when Q is 
unchanged the after-tax price, ( )PtP −= 1~ , is also a  geometric Brownian motion, 
evolving according to: 
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(4') dZPdtPPd ~~~ σµ +=  
  
We denote the discount rate relevant to the X producers and to the source firm by r. 
Following Dixit (1989) we assume that r > µ, an assumption that makes the expected 
rate of growth of P~ , the instantaneous profit, smaller than the discount rate, 
preventing thus the value of the firms that produce X from going to infinity.   
Under this modeling, the X market is the same market studied by Leahy 
(1993). As Leahy (1993) shows, under this setup there is a threshold price, HP
~
, that 
characterizes the optimal policy of each single X producer: when HPP
~~
< the X 
producer does nothing, when P~  hits HP
~
 the X producer buys some N and produces 
more X from it. This optimal policy is the same for all the X producers since they are 
identical. Firms’ purchases of N increase the supply of X and prevent HP
~
 from rising 
above HP
~
. As Leahy (1993) shows, the value of HP
~
 is:2 
 
(5)  HP
~
 = ( )( )wkr +−
−
µ
β
β
1
, 
 
where β is the positive root of the quadratic: 
 
                                                 
2Throughout most of the article, Leahy (1993) studies a more general case then the one presented here. 
In page 1119, though, the analysis takes several assumptions that make it the same as the model in the 
current article. The second equation in that page is equation (5) of the current article. Some notational 
differences should be mentioned: the instantaneous profit is denoted by P~ here and by P there; the 
investment threshold is denoted here by HP
~
 and by P there; the irreversible cost of producing a unit is 
denoted by k in Leahy (1993) while under the notations here make it k + w; the positive root of 
equation (5) here is denoted by Leahy as α. All the other relevant notations are identical. 
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(6)  ½σ2Y2 + (µ - ½σ2)Y - r = 0. 
 
 Applying Y = 0 and then Y = 1 and using the assumption that r > µ shows that 
one root of this quadratic (denoted γ) is negative and the other one, denoted β, 
exceeds unity.  
Dividing by 1 – t, yields the corresponding level of the pre-tax price, P: 
 
(7)  PH = ( )wk
t
r
+⋅
−
−
⋅
− 11
µ
β
β
, 
 
 Given the initial values of A and Q the source firm sets a value of k that 
maximizes its expected present value. We now study the two possible cases. We start 
with the case where this value of k is sufficiently high to make the X producers delay 
their purchases of N, i.e., the case where A/Qα ≤ PH(k). Applying (7) in A/Qα ≤ PH, in 
this case the source chooses a value of k in the range: 
 
(8)  k ≥ ( )( )
( )
wQr
At
−
−
−−
αµβ
β 11
 ≡ k* 
 
Next we analyze the case where the source firm sets a value of k that is in the 
range –w < k < k*. This choice leads to A/Qα > PH(k) and therefore provokes 
immediate purchases of N by the X producers, purchases that increase Q until A/Qα = 
PH(k).  
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2.1 Delaying purchases of N  
In this case, the X producers delay their purchases of N because the source sets a value 
of k that makes the market price P = A/Qα smaller than the threshold PH. 
Let V(A, Q, k) denote the value of the source firm in the range defined by (8) 
given the current levels of A and Q and given a value of k. By Itô’s lemma,   
 
(9)  dV(A, Q, k) = ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) AdZkQAVdtAkQAVAkQAV AAAA σσµ ,,,,,, 2221 ++  
 
and due to (3): 
 
(10)  [ ]
dt
kQAdVE ,,(
 = ( ) ( ) 2221 ,,,, AkQAVAkQAV AAA σµ +  
 
(10) Captures the source's expected capital gain due to the change in A over time. The 
no-arbitrage condition implies that this expected capital gain, together with the 
instantanous revenue from taxing the X market, should equal the normal return to the 
source firm's value. This implies: 
 
(11)  [ ]
dt
kQAdVE ,,(
 + tPQ  = rV(A, Q, k) 
 
Applying (10) and (1) in (11) and rearanging yields: 
 
(12)  ( ) ( ) 2221 ,,,, AkQAVAkQAV AAA σµ + - rV(A, Q, k) + QQ
A
t α  = 0 
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(12) is a second-order non-homogenous differential equation. Trying a solution of the 
form V(A, Q, k) = C(Q, k)AY to its homogenous part yields the quadratic captured by 
(6). Recal that the two roots of this quadratic satidfy γ  < 0 and β > 1.  
We now turn to finding a particular solution for (12). Trying a solution of the 
form V(A, Q, k) = L(Q, k)A yields: 
 
(13)  L(Q, k) = 
µ
α
−
−
r
tQ1
  
 
Combining the solution to the homogenous part of (12) and the particular solution to 
(12) yields: 
 
(14)  V(A, Q, k) = H(Q, k)Aγ + B(Q, k)Aβ + 
µ
α
−
−
r
tAQ1
 
 
where H(Q, k) and B(Q, k) will be determined now using two benchmark 
requirements. To that end, notice that by the standard properties of Brownian motions: 
 
(15)  
µ
α
α
−
=




 −∞ −−∫
r
AQdtAQeE rt
1
0
1
  
 
Thus, the last addendum in the RHS of (14) is the expected value of tax revenues in 
the case that Q never changes, given on the initial levels of A and Q. The two 
addendums preceding it therefore in the RHS of (14) capture therefore the value of 
future sales of Q that occur each time A is sufficiently high that the price of X hits the 
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investment threshold PH. However, if A is close to 0 then the probability of A ever 
rising that high is zero too. In that case therefore the source's value is merely the 
expected value of the tax revenues, the current quantity, Q, generates. Formally:   
 
(16)   ( )kQAVLim
A
,,
0→
 = 
µ
α
−
−
r
tQ1
   
 
Since γ is negative, (16) implies that H(Q, k) = 0.  
 
We now turn to the determination of B(Q, k). As appendix A shows, the 
condition for a no-arbitrage evaluation of the source's value in the time instants when 
there are changes in Q, i.e., when A/Qα = PH, is: 
 
(17)  VQ(A, Q, k) = -k. 
 
Thus, by (14), (17) and H(Q, k) = 0: 
 
(18)  BQ(Q, k)Aβ  +  ( )
µ
α α
−
− −
r
tAQ1
 = -k.  
 
Applying A/Qα = PH in (18) and rearranging it yields: 
 
(18’)  BQ(Q, k) = - 
( )
βαβ
µ
α
H
H
PQ
k
r
tP
+
−
−1
. 
 
Straightforward integration of BQ(Q, k) leads to: 
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(19)  B(Q, k) = 
( )
( ) βαβαβ
µ
α
H
H
PQ
k
r
tP
11
1
−−
+
−
−
 + C 
 
Applying (7) in (19) and simplifying yields: 
 
(19') B(Q, k) = ( ) ( )
( )( )( ) βαβαββ
βαββα
HPQt
ktttw
1111
11
−−−−
+−−+−
 + C 
 
As Q goes to infinity P goes to 0 and the probability of P ever reaching PH 
goes to zero too. This implies that the source firm is not going to sell any N in the 
future and its value should therefore spring merely from the future tax revenues, i.e.:  
 
(20)  LimQ→∞B(Q, k) = 0. 
 
This benchmark dictates a distinction between two cases based on the value of α. We 
start with a case in which α < 1/β. In that case, Q in the denominator at the first term 
at the RHS of (19') is raised by a positive power and as it goes to infinity the entire 
term goes to infinity as well. This, taken together with (20), implies that C is infinitely 
large, and therefore that B(Q, k) and V(A, Q, k) also are infinitely large for each finite 
level of Q, a case that is not at the focus of this article.  
 The economic logic underlying the infinite value of the source value in this 
case is based on the relation between α and the elasticity of demand which is -1/α. 
The smaller α, the larger the demand elasticity and therefore the larger the increase in 
Q each time that P hits PH. Thus, the smaller α, the faster the process of sales of the 
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resource N and the less heavily discounted are its revenues. In addition, the larger 
elasticity due to a smaller α also makes the tax revenues increase by more as Q is 
enlarged. The two positive effects of a smaller α - faster sales of N and greater tax 
revenues - drive the value of future sales of N to infinity, when α is sufficiently small, 
namely - below 1/β . Since this case is not in the focus of this article, the rest of the 
article refers to the case where α > 1/β. 
 Returning to (19’) and (20), now with α > 1/β, the first term at the RHS of 
(19’) now goes to zero as Q goes to infinity, implying that C = 0. Applying (7), C=0, 
(19’) and H(Q, k) = 0 in (14) yields:  
 
(21)  V(A, Q, k) = ( ) ( )
( )β
βααββ
wk
twkttD
+
−++−− 11
 + 
( )µ
α
−
−
r
tAQ1
, 
 
where: 
 
(22)  D ≡ ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1
11
1
11
−
−−
−−
−−
αβββ
βββ
µβαβ
β
Qr
At
, 
 
and D > 0. The following Proposition 1 shows some of the properties of V(A, Q, k). 
 
Proposition 1:  
(a) If α > (β-1 + t)/βt ≡ α* than Vk(A, Q, k) > 0 throughout the range k>-w. 
(b) If α<α* than there exists a single value of k, denoted k1, that maximizes V(A, Q, k).  
(c) k1 is in the range where V(A, Q, k) represents the source firm’s value (the range 
k>k*) iff A/Qα is sufficiently small. 
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Proof: By (21): 
 
(23)  Vk(A,Q,k) = D ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( )( ) 1
1111
++
+−−−+−
− β
βαββ
β
wk
wktwt
. 
 
If α>α* then the term ( ) ( )11 −−− βαβ t  is positive in the range k > -w and 
therefore so is Vk(A, Q, k). This completes the proof of part (a).  
 If α < α* then ( ) ( )11 −−− βαβ t  is negative in the range k > -w implying that 
in that range Vk(A, Q, k) is positive for sufficiently small values of k and vice verse. 
Thus, in this case there is a single value of k that maximizes V(A, Q, k). This 
completes the proof of part (b). Solving Vk(A, Q, k) = 0 yields that this value satisfies: 
 
(24)  k = ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
w
tt
tt
βαβ
βα
−+−−
−−−
111
11
≡ k1. 
 
Applying (24) in (8) shows that k1 is in the range k > k*, in which V(A, Q, k) 
represents the source firm’s value, iff  the following condition holds:
 
 
(25)  αQ
A
 < 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1111 2
2
−−+−−
−
ββαβ
µβ
tt
wr
 ≡ P*. 
 
This proves part (c).                                                                                                        
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(25) implies that the source firm will set a value of k that is sufficiently large 
to make the X producers delay their purchases N if the current demand at the X market 
is sufficiently low.  
  From continuity it follows, by applying (7) in (12), that at A/Qα = PH: 
 
(26)  V(A, Q, k) =  ( )[ ]
( )( )
Q
t
wtttk
11
1
−−
++−
αβ
αβαβ
.  
 
2. Provoking immediate purchases of N 
The X producers immediately purchase N when the market price, P = A/Qα, exceeds 
the threshold PH. Applying (7) in A/Qα ≥ PH, this range becomes: 
 
(27)  k < ( )( )
( ) αµβ
β
Qr
At
−
−− 11
– w ≡ k*. 
 
In this range immediate investment increases Q to Q1 so that the price after the 
investment is done is P=A/Q1α=PH. The source firm receives from this increase in Q: 
 
(28)  k(Q1 – Q) = 










−




 Q
P
Ak
H
α
1
.  
 
Let G(A, Q, k) denote the value of the source firm in the range defined by (27) 
given the current levels of A and Q and also for a given value of k. Equation (29) 
below shows G(A, Q, k) as the sum of two factors: First, the immediate proceeds 
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described by (28); Second, the value of the source firm after the quantity immediately 
becomes Q1, as described by (26).  
 
(29)  G(A, Q, k) = ( )QQk −1 + 
( )[ ]
( )( ) 111
1 Q
t
wtttk
−−
++−
αβ
αβαβ
, 
 
which can be simplified to: 
 
(29’)  G(A, Q, k) = - kQ + 
( )( ) 111
Q
t
wtk
−−
+
αβ
αβ . 
 
Applying Q1 = (A/PH)1/α and (7) in (29’) yields: 
 
(30)  G(A, Q, k) =  ( ) kQkfCA −α
1
. 
 
where:  
 
(31.a)  C ≡ ( ) ( )
( ) ( )αα
αα
µβαβ
β
111
111
1
11
−−
−−
−
−
r
t
 > 0,   
 
(31.b)   f(k) ≡ 
( )α
α 1
wk
wtk
+
+
. 
  
The following Proposition 2 shows some important properties of G(A, Q, k)  
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Proposition 2:  
(a) There exists a single value of k that brings G(A, Q, k) to a maximum;  
(b) This value of k, denoted by k2, is an increasing concave function of A/Qα;  
(c) k2 is in the range k < k*, the range in which G(A, Q, k) represents the source firm’s 
value, iff α < α* and A/Qα > P*;  
 
Proof:  In the appendix.             
 
3. The optimal k when the source firm is maximizing its sales value 
Based on the analysis in the previous sections the source firm's value as a function of 
A, Q and k can be defined and denoted by: 
 
(32)  ( )
( ) ( )
( )


 <<−
≡
otherwisekQAV
QAkkwifkQAG
kQAVG
,,
,,,
,,
*
 
 
Three cases should be analyzed now: The case where α > α*; The case where 
α < α* and A/Qα < P*; The case where α < α* and A/Qα > P*.  
 
3.1. When α > α*   
In this case k2 > k* for each value of A/Qα as part (c) of Proposition 2 shows. 
Thus, in the range k < k* the source firm’s value, represented by G(A, Q, k), is 
increasing in k. From part (a) of Proposition 1 it follows that also in the range k > k* 
the source firm’s value, now represented by V(A, Q, k), is increasing in k. Note that 
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V(A, Q, k*) = G(A, Q, k*) as follows from applying (8) in (21) and then in (30). Thus 
in that case the source firm's value, VG(A, Q, k), is an increasing function of k and it is 
optimal for the source firm to push the value of k to infinity. The economic logic in 
action here is that when α is sufficiently large demand is sufficiently inelastic to make 
it optimal for the source firm to prevent increases in quantity in order to keep tax 
revenues from falling. Note from (21) that in that case VG(A, Q, k) approaches 
( )µα −− rtAQ /1 , which is the expected value of the tax collection, when Q is fixed 
over time at its current level.  
 
3.2. When α < α* and A/Qα < P* 
In this case k2 > k* as follows from part (c) of Proposition 2. Thus, in the range 
k < k* the source firm’s value, represented by G(A, Q, k), is increasing in k. From parts 
(b) and (c) of Proposition 1 it follows that in the range k > k* the source firm’s value, 
now represented by V(A, Q, k), reaches a maximum in k = k1. Thus, since V(A, Q, k*) 
= G(A, Q, k*), the source firm’s value, VG(A, Q, k), reaches its maximum in k = k1.  
 The line marked with circles in figure 1 below presents VG(A, Q, k) in that 
case. The thin line shows V(A, Q, k) and the thick line shows G(A, Q, k).  
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k
k 2 k 1k *0-w
V (A , Q , k ) G (A , Q , k )
 
Figure 1: The source firm’s value, VG(A, Q, k), when α < α* and A/Qα < P*. The Thick line 
shows V(A, Q, k), the thin line shows G(A, Q, k) and the circles indicates VG(A, Q, k). In this 
case VG(A, Q, k) is maximized at k = k1 > k* implying that the source firm sets a value of k 
sufficiently high to delay immediate purchases of N by the X producers. 
 
3.3. When α < α* and A/Qα > P* 
In that case in the range k < k* the source firm’s value, represented by G(A, Q, 
k) reaches a maximum in k = k2 as follows from parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 2. 
Also in that case, k1 < k* as follows from parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1. Thus, in 
the range k > k* the source firm’s value, represented now by V(A, Q, k), decreases in k. 
Therefore, since V(A, Q, k*) = G(A, Q, k*), the source firm’s value reaches its 
maximum in k = k2.  
The line marked with circle in figure 2 below presents VG(A, Q, k) in that 
case. The thin line show V(A, Q, k) and the thick line shows G(A, Q, k). 
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k *k 2k 10-w
k
V (A , Q , k )
G (A , Q , k )
 
Figure 2: The source firm’s value, VG(A, Q, k), when α < α* and A/Qα > P*. The Thick line 
shows V(A, Q, k), the thin line shows G(A, Q, k) and the circles indicate VG(A, Q, k). In this 
case VG(A, Q, k) is maximized at k = k2 < k* implying that the source sets a value of k 
sufficiently low to promote immediate purchases of N by the X producers. 
 
Based on the analysis of the two previous sub-sections, figure 3 below shows 
the optimal k as a function of A/Qα for the case when α < α*.  
A /Q α
k opt
k 1
P *
 
Figure 3: the optimal k as a function of A/Qα for the case when α < α*. 
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The increasing part in this function is concave and the entire function may be 
below zero, as the following proposition establishes. 
 
Proposition 3: If α < t then the optimal value of k is negative. 
Proof:  In the appendix.  
 
4. The optimal k in the case of a welfare objective  
Assume now that the source firm is a government that is not interested in maximizing 
the value of its potential sales of the resource N, namely VG(A, Q, k). Instead we 
assume now that the government cares about welfare in the X market, but also want to 
use it for financing its activities in other markets, markets that suffer from market 
failures and government intervention in them is welfare increasing. Specifically, we 
assume that the government balances these two contradicting targets by setting an 
objective of bringing the value VG(A, Q, k) to a certain level M which is below the 
maximal level of VG(A, Q, k). As established in section 3, in the case where α < α* 
the function VG(A, Q, k) has an inverse-U shape and therefore there are two values of 
k that yields the value M that the government seeks. For that case we assume that the 
government, wishing to harm welfare in the X market as little as possible, chooses the 
lower level of the two values of k that solve:  
 
(33)  VG(A, Q, k) = M 
 
As in section 3, three cases will be analyzed next: The case where α > α*; The 
case where α < α* and A/Qα < P*; The case where α < α* and A/Qα > P*. 
  21
 
4.1. When α > α* 
As established in section 3.1, in this case VG(A, Q, k) is a monotonically increasing 
function of k that converges to the value ( )µα −− rtAQ /1  as k approaches infinity. In 
addition it approaches -∞ as k approaches –w, as follows from (30) and (31). Thus, 
there is single value that solves (33) for every level of M that is smaller than 
( )µα −− rtAQ /1 .  
Note that in contrast to the case where the source is maximizing the value of 
its potential sales of the resource N, here the value of k that is chosen is not 
necessarily infinite. The reason for that is that in the current case the source is a 
government that cares not just about the revenues from selling N but also about the 
welfare in the market for X. The only possibility for the government to set an 
infinitely large level of k is if the M it want s to extract from the x market is above 
( )µα −− rtAQ /1 . 
By (21), (32) and an implicitly differentiation of (33): 
 
(34)  
( )
0
,,
1
>
−
−=
kQAVdM
dk
K
 
 
where the inequality follows from the result that in this case VK(A, Q, k) < 0, as 
established in the proof of part (a) of proposition 1. Thus, the larger the value of the 
revenues that the government wants to extract from the X market the larger the level 
of k it sets. In a similar manner it can be shown that in this case k is decreasing in A 
and increasing in Q.  
We denote the value of V(A, Q, k) at the end of its definition range: 
  22
 
(35)   V*(A, Q) ≡ V[A, Q, k*(A, Q )] = G[A, Q, k*(A, Q )] 
 
where k* is a function of A and Q by (8). Applying (8) in (21) yields V*(A, Q) 
explicitly. Based on the analysis of the properties of VG(A, Q, k) in section 3.1, if M is 
smaller than V*(A, Q) then the government chooses is below k*, implying an 
immediate purchases of N and production of X. Otherwise, the k that the government 
chooses is above k*, a choice that sends the market to a period of inaction until A is 
sufficiently large so that P = PH.  
 
4.2. When α < α* and A/Qα < P* 
Based on figure 1 and the analysis in section 3.2, in this case VG(A, Q, k) has 
an inverse-U shape maximized at k = k1 > k*. In the range –w < k < k* the function 
VG(A, Q, k) is based on G(A, Q, k) and for higher levels of k it is based on V(A, Q, k). 
The value of VG(A, Q, k) at its maximum satisfies: 
 
(36)  V1(A, Q) ≡ V[A, Q, k1(A, Q )]. 
 
Note that k1 is a function of A and Q by (24). Applying (24) in (21) explicitly yields 
V1(A, Q), which is the maximal level of M that the government can extract form the 
market in this case. If the government is interested in a level of M that is satisfying: 
V*(A, Q) < M ≤ V1(A, Q) then the level of k that the government chooses, based on 
(33), is above k*, implying inaction until A is sufficiently large so that P = PH. If, on 
the other hand, level of M that the government seeks satisfies M < V*(A, Q) then the 
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government chooses a value of k that is smaller than k*, implying immediate 
purchases of N and construction of X. 
 An important difference from the case where the source maximizes the value 
of VG(A, Q, k), is that in that case the value of k was constant at k1 whereas here it is 
increasing in Q and decreasing in A.  
 
4.3. When α < α* and A/Qα > P* 
Based on figure 2 and  the analysis in section 3.3, in this case VG(A, Q, k) has 
an inverse-U shape maximized at k = k2 < k*. In the range –w < k < k* the function 
VG(A, Q, k) is based on G(A, Q, k) and for higher levels of k it is based on V(A, Q, k). 
The value of VG(A, Q, k) at its maximum satisfies: 
 
(37)   G2(A, Q) ≡ G[A, Q, k2(A, Q )] 
 
where k2 is function of A and Q by proposition 2.  
 G2(A, Q) is the maximal level of M that the government can extract form the 
market in this case. If the government is interested in a level of M that is G2(A, Q) 
then the level of k that the government chooses, based on (33), satisfies  k < k2 < k*, 
implying an immediate purchases of N and construction of X. 
 As in the case where the source maximizes the value of VG(A, Q, k), the value 
of k that the government chooses is increasing in Q and decreasing in A. 
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Appendix 
A. Establishing condition (17) 
In this appendix we derive the benchmark condition (17) for the value of the source 
firm at the time instants in which P hits PH. For that end we use the discrete 
approximation of a Brownian Motion presented in Dixit (1991). Since it is more 
convenient to perform this approximation for a Brownian Motion, rather than to a 
Geometric Brownian Motion, the analysis is based on the function: 
 
(A.1 )  F(a, Q, k) ≡ V(A, Q, k) 
 
where a ≡ lnA. Due to this definition, to prove that By Itô’s lemma, a is a Brownian 
Motion since A is a Geometric Brownian Motion. The drift and variance parameters 
of a are denoted here by µa and σa2. To approximate the motion of a we divide time to 
small intervals of length τ and the variable a space into steps of size ξ. The variable a 
now ranges over a discrete set of values ai such that: 
 
(A.2)  ai+1 – ai = ξ for all i. 
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Starting at state ai, time τ later the variable a takes with probability p a step 
down to the value of ai-1, or takes with probability q = 1 – p a step up to the value of 
ai+1. Two conditions relating τ, ξ, p and q to µa and σa should be used in order  to 
make this process an approximation of the original Brownian Motion. First: 
 
(A.3)   µτ = qξ + p(-ξ), 
 
which leads to: 
 
(A.4)   q = 





+
ξ
µτ1
2
1
,  p = 





−
ξ
µτ1
2
1
 
 
The condition regarding the variance of the process is: 
 
( A.5)  σ2τ = q(ξ - µτ)2 + p(-ξ - µτ)2 = ξ2 + 2µτξ(p – q) + (τµ)2 = ξ2 - µ2τ2 
 
eliminating the term with τ2 leaves: 
 
(A.6)  σ2τ  = ξ2  
 
When P = αQ
A
 is at the investment threshold PH then, by (1):  
 
(A.7)  αα
11








=





=
H
a
H P
e
P
AQ
i
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if time τ later a takes a step up the endogenous investment by the X producers raises Q 
such that P remains at PH, this implies that Q is raised to the level:   
 
(A.8)  ...
6
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1
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The change in Q during that time is therefore: 
(A.9)  
α
ξαααξ
111








=



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


−







=∆
+
H
a
H
a
H
a
P
e
P
e
P
eQ
iii
 + o(ξ), 
 
where o(ξ) collects all the terms that go to zero faster than ξ, such that o(ξ)/ξ  → 0 as 
ξ → 0. Note from (A.6) that τ too falls under the category of o(ξ).  
 The Bellman equation for the value of the source when ai and Q are such that 
P = PH is: 
 
(A.10)  F(ai, Q, k) = tPHQτ + e-rτ [pF(ai-1, Q, k) + qF(ai+1, Q + ∆Q, k) + qk∆Q]  
 
(A.10) shows the value of the source in that situation as the sum of the immediate tax 
revenue and the time τ later value of the source discounted by e-rτ. With probability p 
the variable a takes a step down and the source's value becomes F(ai-1, Q, k). With 
probability q the variable a takes a step up. In that case endogenous firm's investment 
raises Q by ∆Q and the source's value becomes F(ai+1, Q + ∆Q, k). In addition, in that 
case the source also gains k∆Q from sales to the X producers. 
 Expanding the term e-rτ to a Taylor series, it becomes: 
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(A.11)   e-rτ = 1 + (-rτ) + ( ) ( ) ...
62
32
+
−
+
− ττ rr
 = 1 + o(ξ) 
 
Applying this in (A.10) and expanding terms of (A.10) to Taylor series yields: 
 
 
 (A.12)  F(ai, Q, k) = tPHQτ + p[F(ai, Q, k) + Fa(ai, Q, k)(-ξ) + o(ξ)]  
                  +q[F(ai, Q, k) + Fa(ai, Q, k)(ξ) + FQ(ai, Q, k)∆Q + o(ξ)+ k∆Q]  
 
Using p + q = 1 and the result that τ is o(ξ) by itself helps simplify (A.12) to:  
 
(A.13)  0 = (q – p)Fa(ai, Q, k)ξ +q FQ(ai, Q, k)∆Q + qk∆Q + o(ξ) 
 
By (A.4), (q – p)ξ = µτ = o(ξ) which simplifies (A.13) into: 
 
(A.14)  0 = FQ(ai, Q, k)∆Q + k∆Q + o(ξ) 
 
Dividing by ∆Q and applying (A.9) yields: 
 
(A.15 )  FQ(ai, Q, k) = - k - ( )
( )ξ
α
ξ
ξ
α
o
P
e
o
H
ai
+







1  
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By the definition of o(ξ), as ξ → 0 the second addendum on the RHS of (A.15) 
approaches 0 as well.  This, together with FQ(a, Q, k) ≡ VQ(A, Q, k), which follows 
from the definition of F(ai, Q, k) in (A.1 ), concludes establishing (17). 
 
B. Proof of Proposition 2 
By (30) the first order condition for a maximum is 
 
(B.1)  Gk(A, Q, k) = - Q + CA1/αf ’(k) = 0, 
and by (31.b): 
 
(B.2)  f ’(k) = ( )( ) ( )
( ) α
α
α
+
+
−+−+
1
11
wk
twwk
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: f ’(k) when α > 1. 
 
When α > 1 straightforward differentiation shows that f ’(k) > 0, f ”(k) < 0, and 
f ’”(k) > 0 in all of the range in which f(k) is defined, the range -w < k. In addition f(k) 
approaches infinity when k approaches –w and approaches 0 when k goes to infinity. 
Thus there exists a single value of k for which f ’(k) equals the positive value Q/CA1/α 
k
f '(k)
-w 0
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and for which, therefore, (B.1) holds. Since f ”(k) < 0 throughout the definition range 
this k brings G(A, Q, k) to a maximum. Figure 4 shows f ’(k) in that case. 
When α < 1 the function f ’(k) > 0 only in the range -w < k < -w(α - t)/(α - 1). 
In addition, in that range f ”(k) < 0, and f ’”(k) > 0 , as straightforward differentiation 
shows, and f ’(k) approaches infinity when k approaches –w. Thus, in that case too, 
there exists a single value of k for which f ’(k) = Q/CA1/α and (B.1) holds. Since this 
value of k is in the where f ”(k) < 0 it brings G(A, Q, k) to a maximum. Figure 5 
shows f ’(k) in that case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: f ’(k) when α < 1. 
 
(b). Rearranging (B.1) yields that the value of k in the maximum point, k2, satisfies: 
 
(B.3)  ( )2
1
'1 kfQ
AC
α
α 





= . 
 
(B.3) defines k2 as an implicit function of A/Qα. By implicit differentiation of (B.3): 
 
k
f ' (k )
-w
k = -w (α -t )/(α -1)
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where the second equality follows from (B.3) and the inequality sign follows from 
f”(k2) < 0, as shown in the proof of part (a). Concavity of k2 in A/Qα follows from: 
(B.4)  22
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where the inequality sign follows from f ”(k2) < 0 and f ’”(k2) > 0 which were 
established in the proof of part (a).  
 
(c). Applying (8) and (B.2) in (B.3) shows that k2 = k* iff A/Qα = P*. Yet, iff α > α* 
then k2 > k* for all values of A/Qα, as the following analysis shows. (B.4) can be 
presented as: 
 
 (B.5)  
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From (B.2) and (B.3) it follows that when A/Qα approaches zero, f ‘(k) goes to 
infinity implying that k approaches –w. Thus, by Lhopital’s rule, as A/Qα approaches 
zero the left term in the RHS approaches the term on the RHS leading to: 
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(B.6)            
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Note from (8) that when A/Qα approaches zero k* approaches –w, just the same 
as k2. Also note from (8) that k* is a linear function of A/Qα. Thus, k2 > k* at least for 
sufficiently small values of A/Qα.  
 From (B.2) and (B.3) it follows that when A/Qα goes to infinity, f ’(k2) 
approaches zero. If α < 1 this implies that k2 goes to -w(α - t)/(α - 1) and that f ”(k2) is 
finite. Thus, by (B.4) the slope of k2 as a function of A/Qα approaches zero as A/Qα 
goes to infinity. Therefore, for the case of α < 1 it holds that k2 < k* iff A/Qα > P*, 
since by part (a) of this proposition k2 is a concave function of A/Qα.  
 In the case where α > 1 as f ’(k) approaches zero, k2 goes to infinity and f ”(k2) 
goes to zero. An analysis similar to the one that leads to (B.6) yields that: 
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If α > α* than  
t−−
−
11
1 β
αβ
α
> 1, implying that the slope of k2 as a function of 
A/Qα approaches, as A/Qα goes to ∞, the slope of k* as a function of A/Qα. In that case 
k2 > k* for all values of A/Qα. If, on the other hand, α < α* than as A/Qα goes to 
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infinity the slope of k2 as a function of A/Qα is below the slope of k* as a function of 
A/Qα. In that case it holds that k2 < k* iff A/Qα > P*, exactly as in the case of α < 1.    
 
C. Proof of Proposition 3 
If α < t then α < α*, implying that the source firm’s value is maximized either by k1 or 
by k2, depending on whether A/Qα > P* or not.  As shall be shown now, in that case 
both k1 and k2 are negative. 
To prove that k1 < 0 in that case, note that if α < t then α is also smaller then 1. 
Thus, if α < t the denominator of k1 is always positive since it satisfies: 
 (C.1)  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 011111 >−−>−+−− ttt ββαβ . 
 
Next, note that if α < t the numerator of k1 is negative since it satisfies: 
 
(C.2)   1 – t – (1 - α)tβ < 1 - t - (1 - t)αβ = (1 - t)(1 - αβ) < 0, 
 
since we also assume α > 1/β. 
 To prove that k2 < 0 when α < t, note once again that in that case α is below 
unity. As was shown in part (a) of Proposition 2, if α < 1 then k2 < -w(α - t)/(α - 1) 
leading to k2 < 0.                                        
 
 
  
 
